INTRODUCTION
Lawsuits involving foreign parties present American litigants and courts with unique problems. In addition to questions of jurisdiction over the foreign parties and choice of law, one of the most persistent and challenging problems has been to determine the procedure by which evidence located in foreign nations may be obtained.
American courts have long struggled with the legal questions raised when an American discovery rule or policy is frustrated by foreign statutes or procedures governing the taking of evidence abroad.' These cases have typically involved confrontations with foreign "blocking statutes," which impose a variety of civil or criminal penalties for the removal of evidence from the country. When a party asserts a foreign blocking statute as a defense to a discovery request, a court is faced with a choice between denying the discovery requested or ordering the commission of acts that violate the law of the situs of the evidence. Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979) .
2 See, e.g., Socit Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (although liability under a foreign non-disclosure law does not automatically excuse compliance with a valid discovery order, dismissal or similarly harsh sanctions should not be used when a party makes a good faith effort to comply but is unable because of a foreign blocking statute); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (service of subpoena by Federal Trade Commission upon French corporation invalid); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (contempt order overturned since defendant made a diligent effort to obtain waiver of Canadian regulation precluding discovery); Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976 ), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977 (discovery orders valid even though compliance would allegedly violate foreign nondisclosure laws); United States v. First Nat 'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968 ) (same); In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962 ) (where compliance with subpoena would violate foreign law, subpoena was properly modified but bank must comply with its duty of (1461) In recent years, American courts have encountered a new dimension to the problem of obtaining foreign evidence. The difficulty arises when litigants insist that foreign discovery can proceed only according to the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 3 [Hague Evidence Convention] . Courts presented with this argument must address a conflict between the discovery provisions of a treaty to which the United States is a signatory and the domestic discovery provisions and policies embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar state discovery statutes or rules. 4 Courts in the United States have resisted interpreting the Hague Evidence Convention as providing an exclusive mechanism for obtaining evidence from signatory states. Instead, they have viewed the Convention as offering discretionary procedures that an American court ordering discovery abroad may disregard in favor of procedures authorized by federal or state discovery rules.
This Comment asserts that the Hague Evidence Convention was intended to establish the sole mechanism by which evidence situated in signatory nations may be obtained. The Comment first briefly describes actively cooperating with the government to obtain the documents for discovery). . Actually, a defense to a discovery request asserting the Hague Evidence Convention often is combined with a foreign blocking statute defense by claiming that discovery other than through the provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention would constitute a violation of the blocking statute. See, e.g., Continental Prods. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983 ); Kantor v. Cycles Peugeot, S.A., No. 81-0423, slip op. (D.R.I. April 14, 1982) ; Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) .
" Besides the different interpretation and construction problems presented by a conflict between the Hague Evidence Convention and American discovery procedures, there are significantly different policy considerations involved. The leading blocking statute cases have involved important substantive policy concerns in addition to the policies favoring the availability of liberal discovery procedures. See, e.g., Soci& Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958) ' The Convention was signed by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Northern Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, the United States, and Yugoslavia on April 17, 1970. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, 23 U.S.T. at 2576-77.
7 Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom (including the possessions of Hong Kong, Gibralter, areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the island of Cyprus, and the Faulkland Islands), and the United States (including Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands).
A. Background
One of the primary purposes of the Convention was to fill "the need for an effective international agreement to set up a model system to bridge differences between the common law and civil law approaches to the taking of evidence abroad." 8 These differences are significant. One of the more important differences is that the technique of pretrial discovery by private parties that has developed in the United States is unknown in civil law countries.' This issue has infused tension into international judicial proceedings involving American parties. 1 " A second important difference is that, in civil law countries, the taking of evidence is conducted largely by the courts. Evidence is gathered for trial not by private lawyers conducting interrogatories and depositions, but by judges who choose which witnesses to interview and what questions to ask. After questioning the witnesses, the judge prepares a summary record of the evidence. No verbatim transcript of testimony is kept. 1 Moreover, in the United States the gathering of evidence for use in a lawsuit involving a foreign party is a purely private matter so long as it does not involve compulsion or a breach of the peace; in civil law countries an attempt by a private party to gather evidence for use in a proceeding abroad may be an illegal usurpation of In fact, the differences among common law countries have proven to be almost as difficult to bridge. There have been well-publicized conflicts over American attempts to enforce its policies abroad, especially in the antitrust area, see, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (letter of request from American court rejected because of potential use of evidence in criminal proceeding, which is not a civil or commercial matter, and because of perceived threat to British sovereignty from antitrust proceeding). There have also been disagreements between the United States and the United Kingdom over the permissible scope of pretrial discovery. This difference of opinion led to the inclusion of Article 23 in the Hague Evidence Convention at the United Kingdom's request. See infra note 35.
9 "Pre-trial disclosure as known in common law countries, and especially as known in the U. 465, 466-68 (1983) . [Vol. 132:1461 a "public judicial" function, and considered an affront to that nation's "judicial sovereignty." 12 Recognizing these differences, the drafters of the Convention sought to establish a method for taking evidence that would be both "tolerable" to the state where evidence is situated and "utilizable" in the forum state."
While addressing these differences, participants at the Convention also sought to replace a system of international evidence-taking based on vague and imprecise principles of comity and reciprocity"' with a treaty that would better serve the purpose of accomodating the different judicial systems. Whereas United States participation in drafting the Convention was prompted by the frustration American lawyers had long experienced in their efforts to obtain evidence in foreign nations, 1 5 foreign participation stemmed from a perception of excessively broad discovery efforts by United States litigants and courts. The Hague Evidence Convention, therefore, is best understood as a compromise between judicial systems with very different attitudes toward discovery Perhaps the most pervasive problem of a system of international discovery relying on unspecific concepts of comity is the lack of precise standards governing the balancing of competing interests. Indeed, as one commentator has persuasively argued, "the balancing test [of international comity] usually allows the concern for full discovery to dominate over all other concerns." Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612, 621 (1979). In supplying specific procedures with which contracting states have agreed in advance to comply, the Hague Evidence Convention gives concrete substance to the valuable concept of balancing competing interests. This is a clear improvement over an uncertain system based on international comity. and the taking" of evidence.
B. Key Provisions
The Hague Evidence Convention establishes three basic methods for obtaining evidence from foreign nations: letters of request," 6 use of diplomatic or consular officials," 7 and use of designated private commissionei-s.1 8 Chapter I of the Convention sets forth the procedures governing letters of request. A letter of request seeks foreign judicial assistance in the taking of evidence abroad. An American litigant, for example, files a letter of request in the federal or state court (the requesting court) in which the suit is being heard. The letter is transmitted, either through the Department of Justice or directly to the designated "central authority" in the state from which evidence is sought (the receiving state). From this central authority, the request is forwarded to the judicial authority in the foreign state competent to execute it. These letters of request can be used to conduct examinations of persons, 9 address specific questions to witnesses, 20 and inspect documents and personal or real property.
21
Article 9 of the Convention provides that, normally, the receiving state's laws and procedures will govern the execution of letters of request. The receiving state is bound, however, to comply with requests to use a "special method or procedure" in the gathering of evidence, unless such request is either "incompatible" with the receiving state's internal law or "impossible of performance [under] internal practice or procedure." 2 An internal statute or procedure that is merely different is not grounds for refusing to comply with a request for a special procedure under Article 9; there must be an "absolute statutory prohibition" or "constitutional limitation." 2 3
16 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at chapter I. 11 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at Article 3(e).
20 Id. at Article 3(f).
2 Id. at Article 3(g). 22 Id. at Article 9. For example, a special request might be made that an oath be administered before a witness was questioned or that a verbatim transcript be taken.
See Note, Comparison with Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 388-89. 13 Moreover, "impossibility" rather than "impracticability" is required in order [Vol. 132:1461 Article 10 provides that the receiving state's measures of compulsion must be applied to the same extent in executing a foreign letter of request as in enforcing an order by its own authorities in an internal proceeding. 2 Under Article 11, a witness may assert a privilege to refuse to give evidence under the law of either the state of origin or the receiving state. 5 Article 12 provides that the receiving state may refuse to execute a letter of request only if the request cannot be executed by the judiciary of the receiving state (that is, if it requests an act beyond the power or competence of the judiciary of the receiving state) 26 or if the receiving state considers that its sovereignty or security would be prejudiced by complying with the request. 2 7 Article 12 further provides that a receiving state may not refuse to execute a letter of request merely because it claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or because its laws do not recognize the cause of action involved.
Chapter II of the Convention sets forth the procedures by which diplomatic officers, consular agents, and designated commissioners may take evidence in signatory nations. Depending on whether the receiving state has made a reservation permitted by the Convention, the taking of evidence by these officials may require prior permission from the central authority of that state. 2 " A major limitation on chapter II mechanisms of evidence-gathering is that compulsion against recalcitrant witnesses is not generally available. Although Article 18 provides that a state may make a declaration that foreign courts requesting evidence may apply to the declaring state's central authority for assistance in compelling the giving of evidence before consular agents or commissioners, 29 only four of the seventeen nations that have signed the treaty have made such a declaration." 0 Thus, the taking of evidence by consular agents or private commissioners under the Convention is likely to be feasible only if the witness is willing to testify. [Germany] will not execute letters of request for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents"), and stated that limiting discovery solely to the procedures established by the Convention "would severely restrict the plaintiffs' scope of discovery," id.
Other considerations, however, contributed to this conclusion. West Germany has not made an Article 18 declaration that it would provide assistance in compelling witnesses to give evidence before consular agents or private commissioners. In fact, West Germany has made an Article 33 declaration that prohibits the taking of evidence from German nationals by consular agents or private commissioners. 7 MARTINDALE-HUB-BELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 16 (1984) . Obtaining pretrial discovery of documents in West Germany pursuant to the terms of the Convention, therefore, is a difficult matter. Pretrial discovery from West Germany in any other manner, however, is likely to be just as difficult.
Article 23 reservations are not generally so troubling. Of the 17 signatory nations, five (Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Israel, and the United States) have made no Article 23 declarations blocking pretrial discovery of documents. Seven other nations (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) have adopted limited Article 23 declarations patterned after the British reservation. Id. at 14-20. The British declaration provides that the United Kingdom will not execute letters of request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents but is restricted so as to apply only to letters of request that require a person a. to state what documents are relevant to the proceedings to which the [Vol. 132:1461 cording to Article 27, the other clauses of the Convention do not prohibit participating nations from "(b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act provided for in this Convention to be performed under less restrictive conditions" and "(c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than those provided for in this Convention." 6 Article 27 clearly permits a state in which evidence is situated to allow the gathering of evidence under its less restrictive practices. There is some disagreement, however, about whether Article 27 confers discretion upon a state seeking evidence to order discovery in a manner not specified in the Convention.
3 7
The language of the Hague Evidence Convention does not dearly indicate whether the Convention was intended to establish exclusive procedures by which a court seeking foreign evidence can order discovery abroad. Because the Convention itself is not clear on this issue and Letter of Request relates are, or have been, in his possession, custody, or power; or b. to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in the Letter of Request as being documents appearing to the requested court to be, or to be likely to be, in his possession, custody, or powers.
Id. at 18. Such restricted Article 23 declarations are designed only to prevent nonspecific fishing expeditions for evidence; they do not bar pretrial requests for production of specific documents. The remaining five nations (France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal) have adopted Article 23 declarations that appear to preclude pretrial discovery of all documents, regardless of whether the request is for specific documents or not. 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 7, 14-20 (1984) . Some of these countries, however, may decide to adopt limited Article 23 declarations. In 1978, the Special Commission met at the Hague to review the operation of the convention and concluded that many civil law countries had made Article 23 declarations because of a misunderstanding that "pretrial discovery" referred to "some sort of proceeding permitted under American law prior to the institution of a lawsuit." DIGEST, supra, at 873. See also SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 1427-28. The members of the Special Commission recommended that contracting nations either make no Article 23 declaration or restrict its application along British lines so that it prohibited only fishing for nonspecific evidence. Id; see also Digest supra, at 875.
West Germany and France, however, appear to have rejected the Special Commission's recommendation. These two countries are currently enforcing Article 23 in such a manner as to preclude pretrial discovery of almost all documents, regardless of whether the request is for specific evidence. See Batista, supra note 33, at 65-69 (discussing French interpretation of Article 23); Shemanski, supra note 11, at 480-83 (discussing West German application of its Article 23 declaration).
3' Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at Article 27. 37,See infra text accompanying notes 69-76. because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do provide specific mechanisms for obtaining foreign evidence, 8 Americans courts have viewed the procedures specified by the Hague Evidence Convention as discretionary.
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE HAGUE EVIDENCE

CONVENTION
Although the Hague Evidence Convention has been in force in the United States for over a decade now, few reported cases assess the applicability of its provisions to discovery abroad. One reason for the dearth of case law is that in the first few years after the United States ratified the treaty in 1972, only a handful of other nations also adopted it. 9 Moreover, American courts and litigants, unfamiliar with the provisions of the Convention and perhaps apprehensive as to the scope of discovery available under its terms, have tended to resort to discovery procedures authorized by federal or state rules of civil procedure. 1 Pursuant to Rule 33, for example, a party can serve written interrogatories directly on another party located in a foreign country without judicial intervention. Under the Hague Evidence Convention, by contrast, a party would be required to ask the forum court to request assistance to obtain evidence from the designated authorities in the foreign country through a letter of request under Article 1. The party could also specify the questions it wanted answered under Article 3, thus accomplishing the same result but probably with more delay and possibly with more cost. [ Vol. 132:1461 protested that certain discovery orders, requiring the gathering of evidence in West Germany pursuant to California discovery rules, failed to comply with the Hague Evidence Convention. In Volkswagenwerk, a California appeals court held that the Convention merely provides an "alternative means of obtaining evidence from within West Germany" and that the nations ratifying the Convention had not intended to create a "preemptive and exclusive rule of international evidence-gathering." 4 s From its reading of Article 27, the court concluded that the Convention did not establish "a fixed rule but rather a minimum measure of international cooperation."" The court reasoned that principles of international comity dictate that the procedures established by the Convention were the "obvious and preferable" means for obtaining foreign evidence. 4 5 The court thus held that the party seeking discovery must initially comply with the provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention. 4 " The court stressed, however, that requiring preliminary compliance with the Convention was an exercise of "judicial self-restraint" and that a California court had power to order discovery against a foreign party over which it had personal jurisdiction even though the discovery procedure was not specified in the Hague Evidence Convention.' 7 Much of the same result was reached in Pierburg by a different California appeals panel. In that case a West German defendant who had been served written interrogatories by an American plaintiff objected that the interrogatories failed to conform to the terms of the Hague Evidence Convention. Agreeing with the conclusion of the Volkswagenwerk court, the court held that a state court "should require litigants seeking. . . discovery to first attempt to comply with the Convention before allowing the litigant to disregard it." 48 Cir. 1980) , the court affirmed the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss a products liability action after the defendant had conceded liability because all the evidence relevant to the defense and extent of damages was located abroad. The court noted that the Hague Evidence Convention was available to help the parties gain access to these materials but concluded that "these mechanisms . . . are far from perfect." Id. at 788. The court cited "numerous exceptions" to the availability of discovery under the Convention that could potentially limit the parties' access to information necessary to a full and fair trial of damages issues, thus necessitating the dismissal of the action. Id. at 788-90. It is significant that in Pain the documents and other tangible evidence that were located abroad and that were necessary to a resolution of the question of damages were in the possession and under the control of a Norwegian corporation, which the court found to be beyond the personal jurisdiction of the court. The court emphasized the fact that the defendant's ability to prove affirmative defenses depended on evidence located in Norway that was "immune from the compulsory process of American courts." Id. at 787. There is at least an implication that the court might have reached a different conclusion had the documents been located abroad but under the control of a party to the action over whom the court had personal jurisdiction. This further implies that the court would have felt justified in ignoring or waiving the applicability of the Hague Evidence Convention under such circumstances.
A. State Court Decisions
B. Federal Court Decisions
In Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co., 528 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Va. 1981), anotherforum non conveniens case, the court discussed the Hague Evidence Convention briefly, noting that it was a "less than perfect" system that would not "completely replicate the access to evidence which would exist if all relevant material were located in this country." Id. at 820. In refusing to dismiss the action as inconvenient, however, the court concluded that similar problems would exist were the situation reversed and that the Hague Evidence Convention provided the parties with "reasonable procedures by which to obtain evidence present in a foreign forum." Id. [Vol. 132:1461 the plaintiff to proceed with discovery in compliance with the Hague Evidence Convention," but it refused to rule whether "the Convention is a preemptive and exhaustive rule of evidence gathering. .... ,, 55 The court disposed of the motion before it for a protective order by holding that the plaintiff's initial discovery requests, at least, must comply with the Hague Evidence Convention. 56 A different federal district court concluded, in Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 57 that "the proper exercise of judicial restraint requires that the avenue of first resort for plaintiff be the Hague Convention." 5 8 In so ruling that the plaintiff's "first attempt" to obtain evidence abroad must comply with the Hague Evidence Convention rather than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court expressly disagreed with the decision reached in Lasky, and particularly with that court's construction of Article 27 of the Convention.
5 9 The court in Philadelphia Gear construed Article 27 "in light of the underlying policies" of Convention 6 " and concluded that "it permits only the country in which the evidence is being sought to supplement unilaterally the convention procedures with its internal rules." The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case involving a conflict between the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of 54 Plaintiff was ordered to "draft for this Court's entry, a Letter of Request pursuant to the Convention." Id. at 17,224.
5 Id. at 17,224 n.1. The Court gave some clue to its sentiments on the issue by using the term "postures" to describe the defendant's position that the Convention should be construed as the exclusive discovery method. See id.
56 Civil Procedure. There is, however, some indication of how at least two members of the Court would react if presented with such a problem. In Volkswagenwerk A. G. v. Falzon, 6 " Justice O'Connor, acting as a Circuit Justice, granted a stay of a state court order permitting plaintiffs to attempt to take depositions of German citizens in Germany over the defendant's objections that such action would violate the Hague Evidence Convention." 6 In an earlier proceeding in the same case, Chief Justice Burger had granted a stay pending disposition of Volkswagenwerk's application for leave to appeal the discovery order before the Supreme Court of Michigan."
Justice O'Connor reasoned that Chief Justice Burger "must have concluded that there was a substantial chance that four Justices would agree to consider the case on the merits, that there was a significant chance that the applicant would prevail, and that the injury resulting from the denial of a stay would be irreparable." 6 5 Since the question on the merits had not changed, Justice O'Connor concluded that this decision that a stay was appropriate was "the law of the case." 66 O'Connor, therefore, granted the stay pending disposition of the application for a stay before the Supreme Court of Michigan. 6 7 The implication from Justice O'Connor's order is that Chief Justice Burger believed that at least four other members of the Court would join him in ruling on the merits that the Hague Evidence Convention must be complied with in seeking discovery of a foreign national. These orders, however, leave unclear whether the Chief Justice or Justice O'Connor would construe the Hague Evidence Convention as establishing the exclusive means of discovery in other contracting states or merely as a mandatory initial procedure.
III. PRINCIPLES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
Although American court opinions have interpreted the Hague Evidence Convention as providing, at best, a suggested mode for taking foreign evidence, the Convention was actually intended to provide an exclusive mechanism by which foreign evidence may be obtained. While the language of the document is ambiguous on this point, principles of treaty interpretation, as well as American constitutional doctrine on the role of ratified treaties vis-a-vis existing statutes, mandate an exclusive reading of the Convention.
A. The Hague Evidence Convention Was Meant to be Exclusive
The Supreme Court has held that "when the meaning of a treaty is not clear, recourse may be had to the negotiations, preparatory works, and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties to establish its meaning." 6 " There is no clear-cut negotiating history compelling an exclusive reading of the Hague Evidence Convention. There is, however, documentation offering some guidance for interpreting Article 27 of the Convention-an Article crucial to the determination of this issue. 6 9 Article 27 provides that The provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from-(b) permitting, by its internal law or practice, any act provided for in this Convention to be preformed under less restrictive conditions; (c) permitting, by its internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than those provided for in this Convention." 0 Some American courts have interpreted this article as applying both to states seeking foreign evidence and to states in which such evidence is located." 1 This interpretation of Article 27 has provided a fundamental rationale for a permissive construction of the treaty, whereby procedures specified by the Convention may be disregarded in favor of more liberal American discovery rules. It is apparent, however, that the drafters of the Convention intended a narrower construction of the Article. While Article 27 was intended to give states in which evidence is situated discretion to permit broader discovery within their borders, it was not intended to give states seeking foreign evidence the power to order broader discovery. Since broader discovery is not authorized, the Convention sets forth the only means by which foreign evidence may be obtained.
Philip Amram, the official Rapporteur of the Hague Evidence Convention and co-chairman of the drafting committee described Article 27(b)'s scope, in his Rapporteur's Report, as applying only to the "State of execution. 72 Later in the Report, in discussing the importance of Article 27, Amram indicated that the Article was "designed to preserve existing internal law and practice in a Contracting State which provides broader, more generous and less restrictive rules of international cooperation in the taking of evidence for the benefit of foreign courts and litigants.1 73 Amram's interpretation of Article 27(b) would permit the state of execution to allow foreign consuls and commissioners broader use of compulsion against a witness within its borders than is generally al- lowed under Article 18. Amram's interpretation does not, however, extend to the state requesting discovery the same power or the use of compulsion against a witness." The implication to be drawn from such a reading of Article 27 is that the Convention purports to set forth the sole procedures by which foreign evidence may be obtained. Also in his Report, Amram identified a limitation on other methods of taking evidence that supports a restricted reading of Article 27. These methods-acceptable under, though not explicitly authorized by, Article 27-include traveling to the foreign country to take a deposition of a willing witness, briefing local counsel in the foreign country to examine a witness, and conducting an inspection of property located in the foreign country with an expert. "The only conditions are that the State of execution will permit this . . . .
Amram gave basically the same message to a Plenary Session of the Hague Conference, held October 25-26, 1968, when he reported on the work of the Committee that had drafted the text of the Hague Evidence Convention:
Mr. Amram emphasized that. . . the Convention provided for a degree of flexibility wider than most of the Conventions established by the Conference. Thus any State which became a Party to the Convention had complete freedom to offer unilaterally to any other State, with or without reciprocity, any judicial assistance wider than the minimum presented in the Convention. This, the United States, for example, did and would continue to do, under its internal law and procedures.
6
The inference to be drawn from the Rapporteur's interpretations of Article 27 and the Convention as a whole is that the Convention estab-74 Id. at 339.
" Id. at 342. Amram also gave an example of courts in New York and Chicago appointing German and Italian judges as commissioners and granting them compulsion against German and Italian witnesses respectively to allow them to examine these witnesses in New York and Chicago in their own language and without interference from the local courts:
If the internal law and practice of a particular State offers these broad privileges to foreign courts and litigants, which go beyond anything provided for in the Convention, that State may safely sign and ratify the Convention without thereby affecting its right to continue to offer these extra benefits to foreign courts and litigants.
Id. (emphasis added). 76 Conference de La Haya de Droit Internationale Priv6, IV Actes et Documents de la Onzi~me Session 189 (1970) . The draft of the Hague Evidence Convention was approved at the Plenary Session with 21 delegations voting to accept and one (Yugoslavia) abstaining. Id. lishes flexible, but exclusive, mechanisms for taking foreign evidence.
Another principle of treaty interpretation asserts that United States courts assessing the domestic implications of the Hague Evidence Convention should examine the meaning American negotiators and enforcers have attributed to the treaty."" Since Phillip Amram was the United States representative to the committee that drafted the treaty, 7 8 his interpretation of Article 27 should be of special significance to American courts. This is particularly so in that his report was favorably considered throughout the ratification process." 9 American courts should also consider the report of the United States delegation to the Convention 0 and the Secretary of State's Letter of Submittal to the Senate 8 1 when deciding the intended scope of the Convention. Both documents contend that the Convention establishes "minimum standards" ' 8 2 to which signatory states will adhere. At least one court has misinterpreted the minimum standards language and concluded that the mechanisms established by the treaty are the minimum procedures that all receiving states have agreed to execute. 8 In both documents, however, the references to minimum standards are immediately followed by the assertion that "[a] country may unilaterally offer by internal law and practice, wider, broader, more liberal and less re-
7'
The Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight." Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) .
The and the procedures for taking evidence established by a bilateral exchange of diplomatic notes 9 " between the United States and West German governments pursuant to Article 32 of the Convention as the exclusive means by which an American court could order discovery in West Germany.
92
Another principle of treaty interpretation provides that where the language of the agreement is ambiguous, courts may refer to the subsequent practice of the contracting states in order to determine the treaty's meaning. 9 3 As we have seen, the subsequent practice of the United States government is to treat the Convention as exclusive. Likewise, the practice of the West German government has been to view the Convention as exclusive. sanctioned by the German government for the taking of such evidence. 94 As with the German government, it appears that the subsequent practice of the French government has been to view the Convention as exclusive. Angered by the fact that "the terms of the Hague [Evidence] Convention ... were frequently disregarded by American litigants," 9 5 the French Senate and National Assembly in 1980 enacted a statute that makes it a criminal offense to request or attempt to solicit evidence of a commercial or technical nature for use in a foreign proceeding in a manner not provided for by the Hague Evidence Convention or other international treaties. 96 While an exclusive interpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention is compelled by the intentions of the drafters and subsequent practices of the signatory states, several other principles warranting this construction should be noted. The doctrine expressio unius est exclusio alterius asserts that if numerous exceptions to a treaty are specifically set forth, the treaty is intended to exclude other exceptions. The Hague Evidence Convention provides several exceptions to the chapter I and II modes of obtaining evidence: evidence may be taken under other bilateral treaties pursuant to Article 32; the executing state may permit less restrictive discovery pursuant to Article 27; and a variety of limiting declarations are provided for in chapters I and JJ.97 The conclusion to be drawn is that since the drafters did not provide an exception for requesting courts to order foreign discovery on their own terms, such discovery may not be ordered.
An exclusive construction of the Convention is also compelled when the contractual nature of the treaty is examined. The Supreme dence Convention could be easily challenged every time it is invoked, eventually rendering even its initial application an empty exercise.
B. The Hague Evidence Convention Supersedes Federal and State Rules of Civil Procedure
While principles of treaty interpretation compel an exclusive reading of the Hague Evidence Convention, constitutional doctrine dictates that the provisions of the Convention override federal and state°1 0 mechanisms for obtaining evidence situated in foreign states. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution places treaties on an equal footing with statutes. 1 0 4 The Supreme Court has held that
[i]f the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative, to that extent they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment .... By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by [the supremacy clause] to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. Whether a treaty is self-executing depends on whether it requires affirmative legislative action to make its provisions operative. In United States v. Enger, 10 a federal district court ruled on whether the Vienna Convention, a treaty concerning the scope of diplomatic immunity recognized in the United States, was self-executing. The presence of the treaty's detailed provisions and the absence of language requiring congressional implementation legislation led the court to rule that the treaty was self-executing and that, "upon entry into force, it at once is likely that many attempts at discovery under the terms of the Convention could be deemed "unsuccessful."
103 Under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, a treaty ratified by the United States prevails over state law. In fact, the Supreme Court has ruled that a ratified treaty of the United States may pre-empt a state law that simply "impairs the policy" of the treaty. See United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 230-31 (1942) ; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 62-63 (1941) ; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488-90 (1879); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 277-80 (1796) .
Professor Tribe states that " [u] nder the supremacy clause, it is indisputable that a valid treaty overrides any conflicting state law, even on matters otherwise within state control. Indeed, the treaty controls whether it is ratified before or after the enactment of the conflicting state law." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-4, at 168 (1978) (footnotes omitted). became operative as domestic law of the United States."' 0 7 Given the detailed provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention and the lack of language requiring implementing legislation, the Convention is a selfexecuting treaty.
When a self-executing treaty and a federal statute conflict, the doctrine of implied repeal asserts that the later-enacted will prevail.' 0 , Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that "a treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of. Congress has been clearly expressed.' 10 9
It is arguable whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have the standing of a federal statute vis-4-vis other federal statutes and treaties. 1 0 In any event, no amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly expressing an intent to modify the Hague Evidence Convention has been enacted since the ratification of the Convention in 1972. For example, Rule 28(b), which describes how depositions may be taken in foreign countries, was last amended in 1963."11 According to the doctrine of implied repeal, therefore, the later-enacted Hague Evidence Convention, within its scope, supersedes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Supreme Court has also recognized and applied a "canon of construction which teaches that the legislation of Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Such a rule of construction "is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions."" ' 2 Under this approach, the general discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed as applying only within the territorial jurisdiction Pf the United States unless Congress expressly indicates otherwise.
Finally, the conclusion that the Hague Evidence Convention overrides other mechanisms for obtaining foreign discovery is consistent with a principle of both statutory construction and international conflict of law doctrine: lex specialis derogat generali (a particular law prevails over a general rule).""' Application of this principle leads to the conclusion that the Hague Evidence Convention, a treaty designed to address the specific problems of discovery from foreign countries, supersedes rules governing the more general field of discovery of evidence for use in United States courts.
CONCLUSION
The Hague Evidence Convention establishes an exclusive set of procedures by which evidence situated in foreign states may be obtained. Although a number of American courts have ruled otherwise, it was the intention of the states participating in the Convention that an exclusive mechanism for taking evidence be created. An examination of the Rapporteur's Report, the subsequent positions of three important signatory states, and various principles of treaty interpretation compel this conclusion. As the supreme law of the land, the Hague Evidence Convention may not be ignored by American courts and litigants seeking evidence abroad.
American courts that by-pass the terms of the Convention in favor of more familiar domestic discovery procedures unnecessarily exacerbate the tensions between differing judicial systems. One co-chairman of the drafting committee of the Convention has stated that "[i]t was not possible to ask the Continental countries to change their public policy and their legal traditions overnight and to permit the same kind of free activity in their countries as we have permitted here." 114 By recognizing the exclusive nature of the Hague Evidence Convention, American courts will effectuate the intentions of its drafters and accord the respect that is due to our partners in the treaty.
